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…ὅτι παλαιὰ μέν τις διαφορὰ φιλοσοφίᾳ τε καὶ ποιητικῇ 
“for there is an ancient enmity between philosophy and poetry.”2 
 Evidence for a Parmenidean influence on Plato’s Republic typically focuses on content 
from Bks. V-VI, and the development of Plato’s Theory of Forms. This essay aims to suggest that 
Plato’s censorship of poetic content in Bks. II-III—particularly the rules for portraying divine 
nature (376e-383c)—also draw heavily upon the Eleatic tradition, particularly Parmenides’s.3  
Identifying this further Eleatic influence will be enhanced by my own reading of Parmenides.4 
This reading advocates understanding Parmenides in a more Xenophanean-vein—i.e. by taking 
What-Is to be an explication of the essential qualities of divine nature, and the overall poem as 
rejecting traditional, mythopoetic accounts of divinity. 
 Recognizing this Eleatic influence on the censorship of poetic content, a tension arises. For 
Plato infamously censors poetic styles next, concluding that mimetic dialogue may only be rarely 
employed, and only then in imitation of virtuous persons and actions (392c-398b). This would 
entail banning all poetic works relying exclusively on mimetic dialogue.  Yet, not only do Plato’s 
own dialogues entirely consist of mimetic dialogue, so does Parmenides’s proto-dialogue.  
Furthermore, by so closely imitating Parmenides’s thought and language in Republic, has not 
Plato himself engaged in a type of intellectual and compositional mίμησις?  Just as it would be 
strange to ban the very dialogue (Republic) which outlines and justifies Kallipolis in the first place, 
it would also be troubling to ban a philosophical work (i.e. Parmenides’s poem) which Republic 
is so heavily indebted to.  Such a ban would also seem strongly at odds with Plato’s general 
reverence for Parmenides.5  In an attempt to address these tensions, I suggest that in Republic II-
III, Plato’s lack of concern for banning philosophical works along with mimetic poetry should 
further suggest that he intends the ban to be far narrower than it first appears: as a rejection of 
performative, rather than compositional, mίμησις. 
Parmenides’s Xenophanean-Theism: 
 Parmenides’s poem is traditionally divided into three main sections—Proem, Reality 
(Άλήθεια), and Opinion (Δόξα).  The Proem opens with a young male (κοῦρος), describing his 
divinely-assisted cosmic chariot-ride to meet an unnamed didactic goddess. Upon his arrival, the 
poem permanently switches to the didactic goddess’s discourse.  She expounds an 
epistemological and metaphysical discourse, aimed out outlining What-Is (an entity or type of 
entity which cannot come-to-be, perish, move, change, etc.).  Completing her “trustworthy” 
exposition of What-Is, the goddess segues into an account (Opinion) of how mortals are mistaken 
about What-Is, which includes some (purportedly) “physics” passages (i.e. astronomical and 
cosmological activities).   
 The text of seems to require an overarching, unified message.  Yet, the apparent disparity 
of the poem’s sections has failed to yield this, on orthodox interpretations.  Reality is most 
commonly understood as an entirely secular, metaphysical discussion of either: (a) what the 
entire world is like (i.e. strict-monism), or (b) the essential nature which must be possessed by 
any fundamental being(s).  However, these views of What-Is are quite difficult to reconcile with 
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the “physical” account found in Opinion.6  Even more troubling, I think, is how these approaches 
lack any substantial explanation for the Proem’s extensive mythopetic content.7   
 I argue that the poem can be properly unified—by taking the Proem’s mythopoetic content 
seriously, and understanding What-Is to be a corrective account of divine nature.  While it is true 
that no extant quotation from the poem explicitly idenitifes What-Is as “divine,” there is 
substantial indirect evidence for positing this attribution.  First, ancient sources attest that 
Parmenides was a student/follower of Xenophanes, and the geographical and temporal evidence 
make this plausible.8  This intellectual heritage is actually quite likely, based upon their shared 
use of epic meter, in conjunction with the parallel descriptions of Xenophanes’s “Supreme-God” 
and Parmenides’s What-Is.9  Given Xenophanes’s extensive criticism of the mythopoetic tradition, 
and his apparent corrective on it in the description of his Supreme-God, it would not be surprising 
for Parmenides’s What-Is to serve a similar function—as several ancient commentators seem to 
hint at.10  This view of What-Is also fits well with the broader Presocratic tradition, wherein 
fundamental entities are commonly ascribed divine status, while holding similar qualities 
(eternal, unchanging, etc.).11   
 The key textual evidence for this historical speculation lies in appreciating the long-
overlooked presence of a theogony in Opinion.  Opinion indisputably begins with the didactic-
goddess describing how mortals have erred in “naming” two primordial forms (Light and Night), 
which constitute the world via mixing.12  It is known from Simplicius that DK 12-13 soon followed 
this account.13  DK 12 introduces a cosmic-goddess, surrounded by rings of Light and Night, who 
controls “all things”—particularly sexual union (“mixing”- μἰξιος).  This imagery, along with her 
explicit dominion over all “mixing,” strongly suggests she controls the mixing of Light/Night as 
well—a role confirmed by Simplicius.14  On similar reasoning, later passages about animal 
reproduction (DK 17-18) should also be considered under the cosmic-goddess’s control.  DK 13 
crucially asserts that the cosmic-goddess is the progenitor of all other deities, beginning with 
Eros. 15  Given this, all the disparate content of Opinion can (and should) be tied-together into a 
cosmogonic-theogony. 
 The remaining passages from Opinion are most commonly associated with a 
“Parmenidean physics”:  one about human cognition (DK 16), and the rest (DK 10-11, 14-19) 
which largely concern astronomical entities (Sun, Moon, Stars, Aether, Heaven, Milky Way, 
Olympus) and their activities. Though possible to take (at least many of) these as subjects for a 
physical account, they can even more readily be associated with divinity in the mythopoetic 
tradition.  Imputing a “physics” into Opinion—especially one Parmenides would have 
endorsed—is precisely what raises interpretative tensions, since the text universally denigrates 
Opinion.16 As the text is explicitly clear that mortal views—i.e. Opinion—are what Reality is 
intended to correct, by framing Opinion as a cosmogonic-theogony in the mythopoetic tradition 
(a la Hesiod), a viable target for refutation is revealed, and interpretative tensions eliminated.17   
On this reading mortals err by accepting mythopoetic explanations for the world, like those found 
in Opinion: dualistic, primordial forces being intentionally guided by a supreme controller-deity, 
one which causes new divinities/forces to come-to-be, and controls all other things—even 
thinking and reproduction.  Only by accepting the account in Reality—that divine nature must be 
understood as eternal, changeless, and perfect in every way—can this error be avoided.  
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 This view also provides a substantial interpretative function for the mythopoetic content 
of the Proem.  While the Proem’s content is never explicitly derided, the careful and intentional 
paralleling of its content with that in Opinion is telling. Just as Opinion calls Hesiod’s theogony to 
mind, the Proem’s content also invokes Homer and Hesiod, particularly in its descriptions of 
Tartarus (House of Nights; Gates of Night and Day).18  Opinion introduced an unnamed cosmic-
goddess near its beginning, and the Proem culminates with the introduction of the anonymous, 
didactic goddess.  Both sections mention other divine beings, with lower status (e.g. Justice and 
Eros).  An emphasis on light/night dualistic imagery pervades both sections—primordial (and 
certainly divine) forces in the mythopoetic tradition.19  Given the parallelism, and the clear 
denigration of Opinion’s content as Parmenides’s target, the Proem can be understood as 
identifying that target from the poem’s inception—the mythopoetic tradition, and its conception 
of divinity.   
 Not only does this view avoid the problematic entailments of traditional interpretations 
(e.g. strict-monism), it provides a unified message for the poem that was sorely lacking.  By 
linking Xenophanes and Parmenides more closely, an (early) “Eleatic” tradition emerges—a focus 
on challenging and correcting mythopoetic conceptions of divine nature. This can evin begin to 
explain Plato’s close association of these thinkers, as well as later accounts that aver both thinkers 
had focused on theological matters.20  The following section oulines how this reading can also 
suggest a greater “Eleatic”—particularly Parmenidean—influence upon Plato. 
Platonic Censorship of Poetic Content and Eleatic Mίμησις: 
 Early in Republic, an educational system for producing virtuous citizens in Kallipolis is 
developed.21  This will involve strict censorship of “musical” (μουσικός) education, beginning 
with restrictions on the content of mythopoetic “legends.”22  These content restrictions include 
two broad rules for properly treating the nature of the gods—rules which closely track early 
Eleatic views. 
 The first broad rule is that divine nature is completely good, lacking any evil (R1).23  R1 
has two sub-rules.  First, gods should never be portrayed as engaging in vicious activities or 
conflicts among themselves (R1a).24  Plato’s paradigm violation of R1a—Kronos’s vengeful 
castration of his father Ouranos—closely tracks a passage from Xenophanes.25  The Ouranian 
castration is the foundational conflict for the Titans, and Plato bans this story on the grounds of 
securing virtue.  Compare how Xenophanes praises those who refrain from relating the “lies of 
our fathers” (πλάσματα τῶν προτέρων)—in particular, violent conflicts between the Titans, 
Giants, and Centaurs—as men who “strive toward virtue” (τόνος ἀμφ᾽ ἀρετῆς)26  While nothing 
specifically addresses these themes in Parmenides, taking What-Is to properly explicate divine 
nature would also entail that no such stories could be true.  
 The second sub-rule is that no evils come to mortals from gods, only good (R1b).  To 
defend this, Socrates deploys a deductive “Argument from Omnibenevolence” in relation to “the 
God’s true nature” (ὁ θεὸς ὤν).27  From the initial premise that God must be (omni-) benevolent 
by definition, it would be a contradiction for any evil/harm to come from him. Two aspects of 
Plato’s use of language suggest an Eleatic influence here.  First is the rather strange shift by Plato 
from the plural (“gods”) to a singular subject (“god” - θεὸς), particularly in conjunction with the 
direct object (“the” - ὁ).  The persistence of this usage throughout the passages seems intentional 
and meaningful.28  Plato’s association of the Eleatic thinkers with the doctrine that “all is one” 
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might explain the singular usage.29  Whatever this thesis ultimately meant, it is undeniably related 
to the nature of divinity in the case of Xenophanes, and ex hypothesi, Parmenides as well.30  The 
second linguistic parallel is Plato’s participial use. Rather than using nouns like φυσις or ἰδέα, to 
indicate “nature,” Plato deploys the masculine nominative singular participle of εἰμί (ὤν).  The 
phrase ‘ὁ θεὸς ὤν’ literally reads as “the God’s being,” but must mean something like “the 
essential nature of the God” here.  Similarly, Parmenides regularly employs neuter-singular 
participle forms of εἰμί (τό ἐόν) to discuss the nature of What-Is.31  Furtermore, the ascription of 
omnibenevolence to divinity also fits better with Parmenides.  Xenophanes’s universal denial of 
anthropomorphism and criminal viciousness in divine nature could certainly suggest such a 
view.32  However, Xenophanes’s “Supreme God” shakes (κραδαίναι) all things with its mind, 
implying that God is responsible for all things, good and evil.  While Parmenides’s cosmic-
goddess also “controls all things,” as part of Opinion, it is to be rejected as a flawed mortal view—
and on my reading, an erroneous attribution to divinity. By denying this view of divinity, 
Parmenides avoids attributing the sort of global control and involvement to divine nature that 
entails responsibility for evil.33  
The second general rule—the divine does not deceive in any way (R2)—is also divisible into two 
sub-rules.  The first sub-rule is that God is not a “magician,” capable of changing its 
form/appearance, and thereby deceiving mortals (R2a).34 As justification, Socrates avers that for 
any change, there must be a sufficient cause, either internal or external.  Second, he posits that 
any divine being is the best in every way (πάντῃ ἄριστα)—i.e. perfect—by definition.  Since the 
best entities of any kind are the least susceptible to corruption (i.e. change), as perfect beings, 
nothing external could ever corrupt (i.e.  change) a god.  Similarly, no perfect being would have 
an internal desire (i.e. cause) to change, since no entity desires to become less perfect, which any 
change would entail. Thus, given divine perfection, divinity is unchanging—i.e. there is only one 
form for gods, which must always be maintained.35  
 Xenophanes undeniably preceded Plato in associating immutability with divine nature, 
denying any change in form or location to his Supreme-God.36 And even on traditional views of 
Parmenides, there is a clear parallel between R2a and Parmenides’s denial of change for What-Is; 
yet, accepting What-Is to also be divine helps tighten the parallels.  There are also similarities in 
argumentation, as both Plato and Parmenides use a definitional premise (“currently exists” and 
“perfect,” respectively) to argue that no sufficient cause could make their respective entities 
change.37  Of course, there are also important differences; but even these are telling.  Parmenides’s 
approach requires arguing for the eternality of What-Is first, and then proceeds to also derive 
immutability of form, unity, and ultimately, perfection (τετελεσμένον). 38  Plato’s argument runs 
in a reverse-parallel, taking divine perfection as the given, to deduce immutability of form.  It is 
likely that, without the work of his Eleatic predecessors challenging the mythopoetic tradition, 
Plato could not use divine perfection as an uncontroversial starting point. 
 The second sub-rule is that the gods do not deceive mortals through their words (R2b).39  
Thus, unlike Hesiod’s Muses, the gods never engage in deceptive speech or action. 40  Xenophanes 
explicitly rejects poetic stories in which the gods deceive one another, and thus he would also 
likely have no truck with stories of gods deceiving mortals.41  Similarly, taking Parmenides’s 
poem to be a rejection of anthropomorphism in the mythopoetic tradition would also require that 
divinity not engage in deceptive behavior.42    
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 Beyond the parallels in each sub-rule, a more global case can be made for a Parmenidean 
influence in these passages by considering their similarity to Plato’s Theory of Forms. Plato 
regularly uses the terms εἶδος, and especially ἰδέα, to talk about the Forms; and both terms first 
appear together in the requisite sense when the immutability of divinity is introduced (380d).43  
In fact, it would be reasonable to take these passages as developing a “Form of the God,” and 
thus a first-pass at the broader theory.  The description of divine nature in R1—particularly as the 
font of all goodness and nothing evil—closely parallels the nature of the Form of the Good.  This 
is particularly evident in the Analogy of the Sun. There, the Form of the Good is the cause of, and 
means by which, goodness is possible in the world;44 however, it is also implied to be divine in 
nature, like the Sun is.45  The immutability of divine nature in R2a depends upon divine 
perfection.  So, just as the Form of the Good occupies the highest hierarchical position amongst 
the Forms, the form of divine nature—being the finest and best (i.e. perfect)—also stands above 
all others.46  R2a explicitly introduces “form” language—the gods do not change their appearance, 
but have only one unchanging form (presumably unseen by mortals).47  Similarly, the Forms 
always remain the same and unchanging, only to be thought of and never seen.48  This emphasis 
on a singular divine form—like the singular transcendent nature of each universal Form—may 
also help make sense of Plato’s curious switch from plural to singular in explicating the “nature 
of the God.”  R2 even suggests epistemic parallels: the gods do not deceive mortals by altering 
appearance (R2a), or from their actions (R2b), just as the Forms do not ever deceive—they are the 
sole source of steady and unchanging knowledge.49   
 By accepting Parmenides’s What-Is to be divine, the immutability of divine nature 
becomes a focal theme of (early) Eleaticism.  This view can also reveal a far deeper Eleatic 
influence within the early books of Plato’s Republic. In fact, it allows a sort of diachronic 
progression through early Eleatic views to be imposed upon Plato’s own rejection of the 
mythopoetic tradition.  Beginning with explicit moralistic views of Xenophanes (R1a), Plato 
transitions to views likely shared by both Eleatics (R1b-R2b), while relying more heavily upon 
uniquely Parmenidean language, argumentation, and ontology—thus mirroring the Forms—as 
he progresses.  However, what does accepting such an intellectual debt to Eleaticism in general, 
and Parmenides in particular, suggest for Plato’s ensuing arguments against poetic mίμησις—
especially given that Parmenides wrote mimetic poetry?   
Parmenides and Platonic Censorship of Mίμησις: 
 While Plato’s initial arguments against mίμησις seem rather straightforward at first, the 
scope and implications are ambiguous.50  Socrates first clarifies that there are three types of 
narratives in which poetry can be performed.  Simple Narrative (SN) is found in dithyramb, 
where an author/bard speaks as himself, never using dialogue of or imitating another character 
or person.  Imitative Narrative (IN) is the sort found in theater (comedy/tragedy), consisting 
entirely of character dialogue, which when performed, require the author/bard/actor to speak 
imitatively, as if someone else (i.e. “in character). Epic poetry is paradigmatic of the Mixed 
Narrative (MN), using both SN and IN within a single work.   
 Poetic compositions employing pure IN, though they may delight, often resort to vicious 
or inappropriate imitations, arousing the passions in a manner deleterious for virtuous 
characters.  Thus, pure IN is strictly banned from Kallipolis (i.e. no comedies or dramas allowed).  
As SN entirely avoids the affective perils of IN, it is judged to be the best of all three poetic styles, 
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and always to be preferred.  However, not all mίμησις is deemed inappropriate.  For it is quite 
appropriate that citizens of Kallipolis—especially its guardians—imitate virtuous persons and 
actions.  Thus, MN will also be allowed, so long as the imitative aspects remain both rare and 
virtuous.51   
 It is certainly conceivable that Plato might truly wish to ban theater and traditional epic 
poetry from Kallipolis—after all, they do present alternative educational venues, which may very 
well need to be tightly controlled to insure virtuous persons.52  Yet, it seems quite troubling to 
ban philosophical works from Kallipolis—the ideal city founded upon, and for, philosophy.  It is 
even more difficult to accept a ban on the very works the conception of Kallipolis depends upon 
(i.e. Republic and Parmenides’s poem). That the ban would include Parmenides—especially after 
Plato has just drawn so heavily upon Parmenides’s thought—seems especially problematic.53  
 The first issue to consider is that neither Parmenides’s poem nor Plato’s dialogues neatly 
fit the triad classification of compositional styles.  Plato’s dialogues are just that—dialogues, 
constituted entirely by the very sort of imitative character speech that seems problematic for IN.  
Plato does frame his argument exclusively against poetic styles, and Plato wrote in prose; yet, why 
should the (lack of) meter matter, if the danger is a composition’s mimetic qualities?  As written, 
the compositional style of a dialogue is identical to any dramatic or comedic screenplay, in that 
both consist of purely mimetic “speech,” and at least could be performed mimetically (“in-
character”).  And even if a dialogue is never performed, do readers not often also “imitate” the 
characters on the page, in their minds if not in spoken word?  On the other hand, Parmenides did 
write in poetic meter.  It might first appear that by allowing MN—which is associated with epic 
poetry—Parmenides’s poem is safe.  However, just like Plato’s dialogues, Parmenides’s poem 
exclusively contains mimetic speech—and thus presents the same dangers.  Even were the 
entirety of the poem considered to contain virtuous imitation, the injunction to only use mimetic 
speech rarely would still be violated.54  If Plato intends his ban of IN to be universal, applied to 
all literary works which exclusively (or even too often) consist of mimetic speech, then it seems 
there is no defense to be made for allowing the works of either Plato or Parmenides.   
 Fortunately, there are reasons to think Plato has a far narrower target in mind.  First, it is 
simply prima facie absurd that Plato would ban philosophical works—Parmenides’s or his own.  
Second, Plato never seems to consider how philosophical works might be affected by this ban, 
and it is unlikely he simply failed to recognize the worry. Given this, it seems reasonable to posit 
that he didn’t intend for his ban to threaten philosophical works at all.  This charitable approach, 
in conjunction with his explicit targeting of both drama and traditional epic poetry, recommends 
focusing on the relevant differences between these types of compositions—particularly their 
traditional method of delivery.   
 A culturally relevant distinction can be made, between mimetic dialogue that is both 
written and: a) intended only to be read silently (compositional mίμησις—CM), and b) that which 
is intended to be performed in-character (performative mίμησις—PM).  Plato’s dialogues would 
be a clear instance of CM.  While it would be possible to perform them, it simply wasn’t done, 
and likely never considered.  However, in ancient Greek culture, epic poetry and theatre are 
understood essentially in terms of PM.  If Plato only finds PM problematic for virtue, and his 
arguments only implicate it and not CM, then his own works (and other philosophical writings) 
are safe.   
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 That Plato uses the term ‘mίμησις’ to exclusively target PM is supported by several 
considerations.  First, note the aforementioned explicit targeting of poets (e.g. Homer, Hesiod) 
and theater (drama and tragedy)—No author/work is mentioned which were not actually 
performed.  Precisely how Plato talks about mίμησις in this context is also notable. In describing 
IN, poetry is always something “spoken,” and poets/actors are only mimetic when they liken 
themselves to the characters in speech and action.55  Mimetic poetry is to be “heard,” “seen,” 
and/or “acted out.”56 There is no mention or hint of poetry as something silently read.  This 
strongly suggests that is not mimēsis simpliciter, or even poetic compositions as written, which 
Plato seeks to ban.  It is not reading the written word that concerns Plato. Rather, it is oral mimetic 
performance, which for Plato, is essential to poetry; people acting like the characters as written, and 
the passive audiences’ passions leading them to adopt vicious habits from such performances. 
PM comes too close to realty, and too readily leads the soul astray.57   
 Narrowing Plato’s mimetic target to PM is certainly not a novel approach to these 
passages.  Havelock, if not the seminal proponent, is the most influential defender along these 
lines in the literature; but many others have followed him, to some degree or another.58  This 
approach can certainly help explain why Plato never seems concerned with the mimetic qualities 
of his own works, and their entailed ban from Kallipolis. Yet, it has not been explicitly noticed 
how this view would save other Presocratic works, such as Parmenides’s poem.  Does this 
interpretation of the ban save his poem from it?   Could an analysis of why help support an 
interpretation of Plato along these lines?  To answer these questions, it must be determined 
whether Parmenides’s poem fits PM or CM. 
 It is a longstanding controversy whether Parmenides’s poem was intended to be 
performed.  The primary reasoning behind imputing PM to the poem is the use of epic meter, 
given that style’s associated usefulness for memorization by an audience. If Parmenides’s poem 
were PM, then it would not be very helpful for supporting the PM/CM distinction for the ban.  
The poem would have to be banned, and the tensions between Plato heavily borrowing from 
Parmenides in early books of Republic, only to immediately thereafter ban that influential source, 
would remain—and Plato would be left seemingly unaware of banning the work of someone he 
so revered. On the other hand, Plato’s silence and apparent lack of concern can be taken as 
suggestive; a further reason to impute CM to Parmenides’s poem—at least, from Plato’s 
perspective.  In this case, Plato’s silence would support the PM/CM distinction in the ban, since a 
focus on banning PM would not suggest anything be said about Parmenides.  On my reading of 
Parmenides, the use of epic meter can also be explained—as indicating a target, rather than 
imitating a mode of actual delivery—without needing to cast the poem as an instance of PM. Of 
course, a distinction needs to be made here between what Plato thought about whether 
Parmenides’s poem was performed, and whether it actually ever was.  It is entirely possible that 
both of the following are simultaneously true: (1) Parmenides did write his poem with public 
performance in mind, and perhaps even actually delivered it that way, and (2) by Plato’s time, it 
is not considered a performative work, and thus Plato did not associate it with the “live” PM 
works he was targeting.  
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